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MULTI–PLAINTIFF LITIGATION IN
AUSTRALIA: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
S. STUART CLARK* AND CHRISTINA HARRIS**
I.  INTRODUCTION
Class actions—properly called representative or group proceed-
ings—are a comparatively recent phenomenon in Australia.  During
the past two or three years, there has been an enormous increase in
the number of class actions brought in Australia, even though the first
proper class action procedure was introduced in 1992.  Indeed, Aus-
tralia is the most likely place outside North America for a plaintiff to
bring a class action suit.  Surprisingly, Australia has the highest law-
yers per capita ratio in the world.1  In some key practice areas, levels
of litigation in Australia now exceed those in most parts of the United
States.  For example, only California exceeds Australian figures for
medical negligence litigation.2
In recent times, class actions have been commenced against a
truly diverse range of defendants.  Product liability claims have been
common.  Examples include claims involving Fen–Phen, heart pace-
makers, tobacco, aircraft fuel, and a variety of foodstuffs ranging from
Copyright  2001 by S. Stuart Clark and Christina Harris.
* S. Stuart Clark is a partner of Clayton Utz in Sydney, and the leader of that firm’s
product liability group with particular expertise in the defense of class actions and claims in-
volving drugs and medical devices.
** Christina Harris is a lawyer and member of Clayton Utz’s product liability group.
The Clayton Utz product liability group has been at the forefront of the development of
Australia’s class action and product liability laws.  The group has successfully defended class
actions involving a diverse range of products including tobacco, Fen-Phen, the Sydney water
supply and agricultural pesticides.
1. Australia has 35,000 lawyers out of a total population of 18.8 million people, equating
to 537 persons per lawyer; the United States has 480,000 lawyers in a population of 262 million
people, or 546 persons per lawyer.  See Brave New World?, LAWYERS WEEKLY, June 23, 2000,
at 18.
2. See Greg J. Reinhardt, Comment, Compensation and Professional Indemnity in Health
Care—The Final Report of the Tito Committee, 4 TORTS L.J. 173, 173 (1996).  California has
been reported as the most litigious of U.S. jurisdictions.  See Christine McCarthy, Exemplary
and Aggravated Damages in Medical Negligence Litigation, 6 J.L. & MED. 187, 187 (1998).
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oysters to peanut butter.3  Claims involving many thousands of class
members have also been commenced against major public utilities,
including the suppliers of Sydney’s drinking water and Melbourne’s
gas.4  Banks and other financial institutions, government agencies,
even Ministers of State have also found themselves as defendants in
class actions.5  More recently, we have seen the early stages of the de-
velopment of shareholder litigation, something else that has, until
now, been virtually unknown in Australia.6  This explosion of interest
in the class action mechanism is partly due to the unusual nature of
the Australian rules and the plaintiff–friendly nature of that proce-
dure, particularly as compared with the American rules of civil pro-
cedure.
This Article considers the development of class actions in Aus-
tralia, and critically analyzes the class action procedure as it currently
stands in Australia.  By way of background, Section II provides an
overview of the Australian legal system.  Section III briefly traces the
history of the Australian class action procedure, and reviews in detail
the current procedure used in federal and state courts.  Section IV
then presents a practical view, analyzing how courts have applied and
interpreted the procedure on a case–by–case basis.  Finally, Section V
draws on the Australian experience to suggest which features of the
class action system should be maintained, which should be rejected,
and why.
3. See, e.g., Philip Morris (Austl.) Ltd. v. Nixon (2002) 170 A.L.R. 487 (Austl.) (tobacco);
Schutt Flying Academy (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Mobil Oil Austl. Ltd. (2000) V.S.C.A. 103 (Austl.)
(aircraft fuel); Graham Barclay Oysters Pty. Ltd. v. Ryan (2000) A.T.P.R. (Digest) ¶46-207
(Austl.) (oysters); see also Butler v. Kraft Foods Ltd. (regarding a peanut butter class action
which settled, Federal Court of Australia).  The heart pacemaker class action was commenced
in the Federal Court of Australia in June 2000 and the Fen-Phen class action was discontinued
as a representative proceeding in that Court in late 2000.
4. The class action involving the supply of Melbourne’s gas is still progressing through the
interlocutory stages of litigation.  The action was recently transferred from the Federal Court of
Australia to the Supreme Court of Victoria.  See Johnson Tiles Pty. Ltd. v. Esso Australia Ltd.
& Anor (2001) F.C.A. 421 (Austl.).  One class action against Sydney Water was settled, while
the other was abandoned by the plaintiffs when the defendants established that nobody was ac-
tually injured.
5. See, e.g., Zhang v. Minister for Immigration, Local Gov’t and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 45
F.C.R. 384 (Austl.) (involving a State Minister); Marks v. GIO Australia Holdings Ltd. (1998)
196 C.L.R. 494 (Austl.) (financial institution).
6. See King v. GIO Australia Holdings Ltd. (2000) F.C.A. 1649 (Austl.) (still being liti-
gated before the Federal Court of Australia).
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II.  OVERVIEW OF THE AUSTRALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Australia is a federation comprising six states and two self–gov-
erning territories.  The Australian Constitution specifies a range of
matters that are the responsibility of the federal government.  The
balance of legal issues remains the responsibility of the various state
and territory governments.
Australia’s laws and legal system have their foundation in the
common law of England.  Even today, reference is often made to the
decisions of English courts.  However, while the judgments of the
House of Lords and the English Court of Appeal are of persuasive
authority, they are not binding on Australian courts.  More recently,
in developing Australia’s law, its courts have looked to the jurispru-
dence of other countries, particularly the United States and Canada.
Australia has both a federal court system and a hierarchy of
courts in each of the states and territories.  In all cases, the ultimate
appellate court is the High Court of Australia (High Court).  The
High Court is also responsible for the determination of constitutional
disputes, in the same way as the U.S. Supreme Court.
Actions heard by Australian courts proceed on an adversarial
basis.  The practice and procedure, including rules of evidence, are
similar to those in English courts.  Civil proceedings in Australia are
generally heard by a judge sitting without a jury.  However, it is pos-
sible to have a matter heard by judge and jury in most of the state and
territory supreme courts.  Juries are, as a matter of practice, not avail-
able in matters heard in the Federal Court of Australia (Federal
Court).7
III.  CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE IN AUSTRALIA
A. Introduction
Until recently, the only Australian court that had a proper class
action procedure was the Federal Court.  Class actions in the Federal
Court are referred to as representative proceedings.  The procedure
regulating representative proceedings in that court came into effect
on March 4, 1992, with the insertion of Part IVA into the Court’s
enabling act.8
7. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
8. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976 (Cth.).  Part IVA was inserted by the Federal
Court of Australia Amendment Act, 1991, no. 181, § 3 (Cth.).
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Prior to this time, Australian law, like that of the United King-
dom, did not incorporate the concept of a class action.  While the
various courts’ rules had provided for more than one plaintiff to join
an action against a defendant or group of defendants, a number of
procedural limitations had, for many years, restricted these proce-
dures to the most limited of circumstances.  These are outlined briefly
below.
Effective January 1, 2000, the Supreme Court of Victoria, a state
court, first amended its rules to provide for a class action procedure
virtually identical to that of the Federal Court.  Class actions in Victo-
ria are known as group proceedings.9  More recently, Victoria’s Su-
preme Court Act 1986 has been amended to insert a new Part 4A en-
titled “Group Proceeding.”10  Part 4A supersedes the earlier
amendment to the rules and is deemed to have come into effect on
January 1, 200011 and essentially replicates Part IVA of the Federal
Court Act—it even adopts the same section numbers (with minor ex-
ceptions).  However, there are important differences due to the fact
that the Supreme Court of Victoria is a state court.12
Class actions cannot be brought in any other state courts.  How-
ever, both the Federal Court and the Supreme Court of Victoria class
action procedures have survived recent constitutional challenges.13  It
may be that the other states are awaiting the final outcome of these
challenges.  It is the Authors’ opinion that other states will likely fol-
low Victoria’s lead.
In Australia, the class of members is referred to as the group and,
in the Federal Court, the terms applicant and respondent are used in-
9. See Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or. 18A (Vict.).  The
amendment was inserted into the Victorian Supreme Court Rules by virtue of the Supreme
Court Rules, 1999, ch. 1, am. 11 (Vict.).
10. See Courts and Tribunals Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2000, § 13
(Vict.).
11. The Courts and Tribunals Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2000 (Vict.)
received Royal Assent on November 28, 2000, but the provision which inserts Part 4A (namely
§ 13) is deemed to have commenced on January 1, 2000 (per § 2(2)).  While this Act does not
repeal Rule 18A of the Victorian Supreme Court Rules, a proceeding commenced under Rule
18A.03 prior to the passing of the Courts and Tribunals Legislation Act is taken to have been
commenced under the new Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act (§ 33ZK of the Supreme Court
Act).
12. See discussion infra Section IV.
13. See Femcare Ltd. v. Bright (2000) 172 A.L.R. 713 (Austl.) (upholding the validity of the
Federal Court representative proceedings procedure); see also Schutt Flying Academy (Austl.)
Pty. Ltd. v. Mobil Oil Austl. Ltd. (2000) V.S.C.A. 103 (Vict.) (upholding the validity of the Su-
preme Court of Victoria group proceedings procedure).  An application for leave to appeal
Femcare will be heard by the full High Court on a date yet to be advised.
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stead of plaintiff and defendant.  For the sake of simplicity, we refer in
this Article to the person or persons who commence representative or
group proceedings as the plaintiff and the respondent or defendant as
the defendant.  Representative or group proceedings shall be referred
to as class actions and the group as the class.
B. Historical Development of the Procedure
1. Common Law Representative Actions.  The class action is an
extension of the representative action, which originated in the English
Chancery courts.  Prior to the introduction of the class action mecha-
nism in the Federal Court, the procedural rules in that Court, in
common with all Australian superior courts of record, provided (and
still provide) for representative actions.  That is, where numerous
persons have the same interest in the proceeding, one or more of
them may represent the others.14
The same interest requirement has been interpreted narrowly to
mean that actions claiming damages cannot be brought in representa-
tive form because each claimant’s entitlement to damages would have
to be independently assessed.15  This absolute position has been tem-
pered to allow damages to be claimed in a representative action
where it is procedurally simpler and more convenient to determine a
global figure for the class rather than inquire into each member’s in-
dividual interest.16
The limitations of the representative action were discussed by
the Australian Law Reform Commission (A.L.R.C.) in a report that
led to the introduction of class actions in the Federal Court.17  The
representative action still survives in Australian jurisdictions.18  Some
14. See Federal Court Rules, 1979 (Austl.), Or. 6.13(1) (“Where numerous persons have
the same interest in any proceeding the proceeding may be commenced, and, unless the Court
otherwise orders, continued, by or against any one or more of them as representing all or as rep-
resenting all except one or more of them.”).  For state court rules providing for representative
actions, see discussion infra Section III.B.1.
15. See Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd., 2 K.B. 1021 (Eng. C.A. 1910); see
also Barnes & Co. Ltd. v. Sharpe (1910) 11 C.L.R. 462 (Austl.); Dillon v. Charter Travel Co.
Ltd. (1988) A.T.P.R. ¶ 40-872 (Austl.).
16. See EMI Records Ltd. v. Riley, 2 Eng. Rep. 838 (Eng. C.A. 1981); see also Carnie v.
Esanda Fin. Corp. Ltd. (1995) 182 C.L.R. 398 (Austl.).
17. See Australian Law Reform Commission, Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court,
Report No. 46, ¶¶ 5, 40-45 (1989) [hereinafter A.L.R.C. Report].
18. See Federal Court Rules, 1979 (Austl.), Or. 6.13; Supreme Court Rules Part 8 r. 13(1)
(N.S.W.); Supreme Court Rules O. 19 r. 10 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Supreme Court Rules R. 34.08
(S. Austrl.); General Rules of Procedure in Civil Proceedings O. 18.02 (Vict.); Uniform Civil
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of these jurisdictions permit representative actions in which damages
are claimed.19
2. First Class Action Procedure in the Supreme Court of
Victoria.  In 1986, the Victorian Parliament was the first to attempt to
introduce class actions into Australia, by virtue of two statutory
provisions.20  The procedure provided that a representative
proceeding may be commenced where three or more persons have
the right to the same or substantially the same relief against the same
person and where, if separate proceedings were brought, there would
be a common question of law or fact.21  These provisions were
recently repealed by the legislation which introduced group
proceedings into the Supreme Court Act.22
The procedure set down very few requirements.  Basically, it es-
tablished an opt–in system: prior to commencement of the proceed-
ing, all represented persons were required to consent in writing to be
represented,23 or, after commencement, they were required to consent
in writing and obtain the leave of the Court.24  All members of the
class had to be named in the originating process.25  The relevant pro-
visions did not provide any detail as to precisely how the representa-
tive proceeding was to be heard, but merely empowered the Supreme
Court of Victoria to give directions concerning their administration.26
The novel procedure was criticized extensively by the courts and
the A.L.R.C.27  Indeed, in 1992, the Victorian Court of Appeal went
as far as saying that the procedure raises “a substantial number of al-
Procedure Rules Part 1 r. 75 (Queensl.); Rules of the Supreme Court O. 18 r. 12 (W. Austrl.);
Supreme Court Rules O. 18 r. 2 (N. Terr.); Rules of the Supreme Court O. 18 r. 9 (Tas.).
19. See Supreme Court Rules R. 34.03(a) (S. Austl.).
20. See Supreme Court Act, 1986, §§ 34, 35 (Vict.).  Such a representative proceeding could
be brought under these provisions even if the relief to which each person was entitled was or
included damages.  See Supreme Court Act, 1986, § 35(6)(a) (Vict.).
21. See id. § 34(a).
22. See Courts and Tribunals Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2000, § 14
(Vict.).  The repeal was effective from November 28, 2000 (pursuant to § 2(1) of the amending
Act).
23. See Supreme Court Act, 1986, § 35(2)(a) (Vict.).
24. See id. § 35(4).
25. See id. §35(3).
26. See id. § 35(5).
27. See Zentahope Pty. Ltd. v. Bellotti, BC 9203164 (1992) (Vict.); see also A.L.R.C. Re-
port, supra note 17, at ¶ 45; A & J Partitions Pty. Ltd. v. Jolly, BC 9300648 (1993) (Vict.)
(Beach, J.).  The A.L.R.C.’s criticism was directed at the opt-in nature of the procedure, such
that those ignorant of their rights or of the existence of the proceedings would not be included
even if they had the same cause of action as those represented in the proceedings.
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most insoluble questions of construction,” and that careful considera-
tion should be given to its repeal or else “those for whose benefit one
surmises it was enacted are likely to become its victims.”28  The
Court’s principal concern was that the enabling provisions were so
brief as to be indeterminate, and that their wording restricted the
Court’s ability to use its discretion to overcome the apparent defi-
ciencies.29  No proceedings ever progressed to final hearing under
these provisions.  The criticisms led to calls by the legal profession to
make the Victorian class action laws more accessible, which, in turn,
resulted in the recent introduction of group proceedings into the Su-
preme Court of Victoria.
3. Law Reform in the 1990s.  During the early 1990s, the federal
government introduced both a strict liability regime for product li-
ability claims30 and a system of class actions in the Federal Court.31  It
did this with knowledge that these changes would increase the level of
product liability litigation and the costs to manufacturers.32  At the
same time, the early stages of competition policy swept away many of
the historical rules that had constrained the activities of the legal pro-
fession.  These included prohibitions on contingency fee agreements33
and advertising by lawyers.
Initially these reforms appeared to have little effect.  However,
over the past two or three years, a number of plaintiffs’ lawyers have
come to recognize the potential of the changes and have taken steps
to exploit them to their considerable advantage.  As events unfolded,
the introduction of the Federal Court class action procedure was by
far the most significant development of the 1990s reforms.34
28. Zentahope, BC 9203164 at 12 (Brooking, J.), 17, 24 (Fullagar, J.).
29. See id. at 17 (Fullagar, J.), 5, 10, 11, 12 (Brooking, J.), 1, 12 (Tadgell, J.).
30. See Trade Practices Act, 1974, Part VA (Austl.).
31. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, Part IVA (Austl.).
32. See Report by Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Dec.
1992, 15-16, 26.
33. For many years, all contingency fee agreements were illegal in Australia.  The changes
introduced during the early 1990s sanctioned contingency fee arrangements, which increase the
lawyer’s usual fee by way of a previously agreed percentage or “uplift.”  See, e.g., Legal Profes-
sion Act, 1987, § 187 (N.S.W.) (capping the maximum uplift in New South Wales at 25%).
However, contingency fee agreements that calculate the fee by reference to a percentage of the
verdict recovered remain illegal.  Consequently, contingency fee arrangements are more re-
stricted in Australia than in the United States.
34. As mentioned earlier, class actions were introduced into the Federal Court by a new
Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976 (Austl.).  Two other relevant federal
statutory provisions were introduced in 1992.  Firstly, § 75AQ was inserted into the Trade Prac-
tices Act, empowering the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) to
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C. A “Plaintiff–Friendly” Procedure
Before considering in detail the Australian rules as they relate to
class actions, it is useful to understand how the approach of the Aus-
tralian procedure differs from that of other jurisdictions, particularly
the United States.  There are three main differences, all of which
make the Australian procedure more plaintiff–friendly than its
American counterpart.
1. No Certification Requirements.  First, unlike the U.S. class
action procedure, the Australian procedure has no certification re-
quirements.  That is, in order to be brought as a class action, there is
no threshold requirement that the proceedings be judicially certified
as appropriate.35  In considering whether to certify an action, a U.S.
court will carefully consider the issues involved and determine
whether the action satisfies the tests imposed by the rules, particularly
the requirement for common questions of law or fact.36  Importantly,
the onus is on the class plaintiff to establish that the formal require-
ments for a class action have been fulfilled, as opposed to ordinary
civil litigation where the defendant must establish that any formal re-
quirements have not been fulfilled.37  In recent years, U.S. courts have
displayed an increasing willingness to deny certification of class ac-
tions that fail to satisfy the rules.38
In contrast, no such requirement is imposed in Australia.  The
Australian rules provide for the defendant to move the court to ter-
minate the class action in certain limited circumstances.39  The Federal
Court decided not to adopt a certification requirement because the
bring representative proceedings on behalf of one or more persons who have suffered loss as a
result of a contravention of Part VA of the Trade Practices Act, provided that those persons
consent.  See Trade Practices Act, 1974, §75AQ (Austl.).  Secondly, § 87(1B) of the Trade Prac-
tices Act (originally inserted in 1986) was amended to empower the ACCC in prosecution pro-
ceedings under § 79 or injunction proceedings under § 80, to bring representative proceedings
on behalf of persons who have suffered or are likely to suffer loss or damage as a result of a con-
travention of Part IV or Part V of the TPA. See Trade Practices Act, 1974, §87(1B) (Austl.).
35. In contrast, representative actions in South Australia require representative parties,
within 28 days after the defendant files an appearance, to apply to the court for an order
authorizing the action to be maintained as a representative action. See Supreme Court Rules, R.
34.02(a) (S. Austl.).  The requirement for a certification hearing in the United States is set out in
the FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).  Cf. An Act Respecting the Class Action R.S.Q. 1977, ch. 8, art. 1002
(Que.) (mandating an “authorization hearing”).
36. See Georgine v. Amchem Prod. Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996).
37. See In re Am. Med. Sys. Inc. 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996), and cases cited therein.
38. See Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Curbs on Class Action Abuses, 8 AUSTL.
PROD. LIAB. REP. 83 (1997).
39. See discussion infra Section III.C.6.
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American experience illustrated unwarranted expense and delays in
conducting and appealing certification hearings, especially where the
defendant had a right to challenge the validity of the procedure at any
time.40  Reversing the burden of convincing the court that a matter
should be discontinued as a class action requires an Australian defen-
dant to be more vigilant and proactive than his or her American
counterpart.
2. “Substantial” Common Issue of Law or Fact.  Second, the
U.S. rules contain inter alia three requirements regarding the claims
of the class: that there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, that the claims of the representative parties are typical of the
claims of the class,41 and that the common issues between class mem-
bers predominate over the individual issues.42  If these requirements
are not satisfied, the matter will not proceed as a class action.43  Con-
versely, Australia merely requires (inter alia) at least one “substantial
common issue of law or fact.”44  Thus, it does not appear to matter
that the common issue or issues are insignificant when compared with
the individual issues.
3. Determination of Individual and Subgroup Issues.  Third, the
Australian rules, unlike those in the United States, expressly provide
for the determination of what are described as subgroup or individual
issues as part of a class action.45  This has meant that Australian courts
have generally not refused to deal with an action as a class action just
because it is more properly described as a mass of individual claims
with some common connections.  The classic example of this type of
action is one involving a drug or medical device.  In the United States,
courts have been reluctant to allow such actions to proceed as class
actions given the unique issues of causation usually raised by individ-
40. See A.L.R.C. Report, supra note 17, at ¶ 146.
41. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
42. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
43. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prod. Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996) (the latter re-
quirement was not satisfied).
44. Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33C(1) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court Act,
1986, § 33C(1) (Vict.); discussion infra Section IV.B.4; cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Proce-
dure) Rules, 1996, Or. 18A.03(1) (Vict.).
45. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33Q-R (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33Q-R (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.15-16 (Vict.).
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ual class members.46  However, some of the persons involved in the
development of class actions in the Federal Court expressly intended
an action of this nature to proceed as a class action.47  It is this aspect
of the Australian procedure which, it is suggested, should be revised,
as discussed in Section V of this Article.
D. Procedural Requirements
1. Initiating a Class Action.  In order to commence a class ac-
tion in Australia, the following threshold tests must be satisfied:
 At least seven persons must have claims against the same
person(s);
 The claims of all these persons must arise out of the same,
similar, or related circumstances; and
 The claims of all these persons must give rise to at least one
substantial common issue of law or fact.48
A class action can only be commenced in the Federal Court if the
cause of action arises after commencement of the Act that introduced
the procedure, namely March 4, 1992.49  However, the Supreme Court
of Victoria has no such requirement and therefore, a class action may
be commenced there regardless of when the cause of action arose.50
In relation to the time limitation in Federal Court class actions, it
must be remembered that, since damage is an essential element of li-
ability, no cause of action accrues until damage has occurred.51  In the
product liability context, a product may be sold by a manufacturer but
not fail or otherwise injure the claimant until well after the sale.  Ac-
cordingly, in circumstances where damage is not suffered until some
time after the other elements of the cause of action have arisen, the
circumstances giving rise to the cause of action may well provide the
46. See, e.g., In re N. D. Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 856 (9th
Cir. 1982).
47. See A.L.R.C. Report, supra note 17, at ¶ 63 (1989).  The A.L.R.C. decided to allow
such class actions based on submissions made by plaintiffs’ lawyers, such as Dr. Peter Cashman,
that it was unfair that litigation such as the Dalkon Shield proceedings not be allowed to pro-
ceed as grouped proceedings.  Due to the unavailability of class actions in New South Wales,
this litigation was run as a more traditional “test case” style quasi-class action.
48. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33C(1) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33C(1) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.03(1) (Vict.).
49. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33B (Austl.).
50. See Supreme Court Act, 1986, § 33B(1) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Pro-
cedure) Rules, 1996, Or. 18A.02(1) (Vict.).
51. See JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 217 (9th ed. 1998).
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basis of a class action, even though the product was supplied prior to
March 4, 1992.
2. The Class.  As a general rule, the consent of a person to be a
class member is not required.52  However, a member may opt out of
the class action by written notice within a period specified by the
court.53  While a plaintiff is obliged to describe the class, there is no
obligation to identify, name, or even specify the number of the class
members.54  The court may, at any stage in the proceedings, grant
leave to amend the pleadings to alter the description of the class.55
Such an amendment may even include additional class members who
did not have a cause of action at the time the proceedings were com-
menced.56
3. Opt–out Procedure.  Once proceedings have commenced, the
court will fix a date by which a class member may opt out of the pro-
ceedings.57  Members opt out by giving written notice to the court.58
The court will also give directions regarding the manner in which
class members are to be notified of the fact that the proceedings have
been commenced and the procedure that must be followed in the
event that they wish to opt out of those proceedings.59
52. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33E(1) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33E(1) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.05(1) (Vict.).
53. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33J (Austl.); see also Supreme Court Act,
1986, § 33J (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or. 18A.09
(Vict.).
54. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33H (Austl.); see also Supreme Court Act,
1986, § 33H (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or. 18A.07
(Vict.).
55. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33K(1) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33K(1) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.10(1) (Vict.).
56. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33K(2) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33K(2) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.10(2) (Vict.).
57. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33J(1) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33J(1) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.09(1) (Vict.).
58. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33J(2) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33J(2) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.09(2) (Vict.).
59. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33Y (Austl.); see also Supreme Court Act,
1986, § 33Y (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or. 18A.23
(Vict.).
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The form of notice is at the discretion of the court and, for ex-
ample, may be given by way of advertisements in newspapers or
broadcast on radio or television.60  Recently, the Federal Court de-
cided to establish a web site to inform putative class members in the
$750 million class action against the GIO of the details of the claim by
providing access to the current pleadings.61  The notice, which summa-
rizes the claims made by the representative plaintiff, will be mailed to
putative class members.62  However, the court was of the opinion that
the putative class members should also have access to the pleadings
via the internet to enable them to determine whether they are in fact
members.63  The court decided to establish the web site as an alterna-
tive to the plaintiff’s suggestion of using the web site maintained by
his lawyers (the court considered the latter to be problematic because
the lawyers’ web site contained promotional material).64  While the
rules leave open the question of who should pay for these advertise-
ments, it has been the plaintiffs who have had to meet the initial costs
to date.
Unless a person actually takes the step of opting out in writing,
he or she will continue to be part of the action and be bound by its
outcome.65  Of course, there remains a real possibility that a person
who is deemed to be a class member by virtue of the class description
may never actually become aware that proceedings have commenced
and will nevertheless become bound by the result of those proceed-
ings by default.
4. Subgroups and Individual Class Members.  As mentioned
earlier, provision is made in Australian class action procedure for the
determination of specific issues in the proceedings relating to “sub-
groups” or even individuals.66  Thus, the fact that the circumstances
60. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33Y(4) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33Y(4) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.23(3) (Vict.).
61. See King v. GIO Australia Holdings Ltd. (2000) F.C.A. 1869 ¶¶ 20-22 (Austl.).
62. See id. ¶ 19.
63. See id. ¶ 22.
64. See id.
65. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33ZB(b) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33ZB (b) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.27(b) (Vict.).
66. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33Q-R (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33Q-R (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.15-16 (Vict.).
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giving rise to a class action can only be resolved at an individual level
will not prevent the matter from proceeding as a class action.
5. Judgment and Costs.  Judgment in a class action binds all
persons who are members of the class—that is those persons who fall
within the class description and have not opted out in writing—at the
date judgment is given, regardless of whether or not they even knew
of the proceedings.67  Where the court finds in favor of the class, it
may inter alia make an award of damages to class members, subgroup
members or even individual members.68  According to the circum-
stances, the court may award damages consisting of:
 specified amounts;
 amounts calculated in a particular manner; or
 an aggregate amount without specifying the amounts to be
awarded with respect to individual class members.69
Where the last option is adopted, a mechanism is then established to
determine the share of the aggregate amount to which each member
is entitled.70
In Australia, the so–called “English Rule” applies in relation to
the payment of the costs of legal proceedings, including class actions.71
As a general rule, the successful party’s costs must be paid by the un-
successful party.  In this context, the term “costs” includes not only
out–of–pocket expenses (called disbursements in Australia), but also
attorney’s fees.  However, in the case of class actions, the rules ex-
pressly prohibit a costs order being made against the class members
other than the plaintiff(s) who actually commenced the proceedings.72
67. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33ZB(b) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33ZB(b) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.27 (Vict.).
68. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33Z(1)(e) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33Z(1)(e) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.25(1)(e) (Vict.).
69. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33Z(1)(e)-(f) (Austl.); see also Supreme
Court Act, 1986, § 33Z(1)(e)-(f) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules,
1996, Or. 18A.25(1)(e)-(f) (Vict.).
70. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33Z(2), (4) (Austl.); see also Supreme
Court Act, 1986, § 33Z(2), (4) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996,
Or. 18A.25(2), (4) (Vict.).
71. See ROGER QUICK, QUICK ON COSTS 9 (1996) (regarding the historical origins of the
English Rule).
72. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 43(1A) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33ZD(b) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.30 (Vict.).  There is currently no provision for members of an unsuccessful class to be or-
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A costs order may also be made in favor of those individuals who
commence proceedings where the action is successful or where the
court otherwise orders.73
Needless to say, plaintiffs’ lawyers are often careful to nominate
as the representative party a person of straw—that is to say, someone
who has no assets and who is therefore incapable of satisfying any
significant order for costs made in favor of the defendant.  Defen-
dants have responded to this tactic by seeking what is known as an
order for security for costs against the plaintiff.  This is an order that
can be made by the court requiring a plaintiff to pay into court, or
otherwise give security for, an amount equal to the estimated costs of
the proceedings—including attorney’s fees.  Initially, the courts were
reluctant to make such orders in the context of a class action.74  How-
ever, an order for security for costs was recently made against an in-
corporated organization that was specifically established to com-
mence a class action against the tobacco industry.75
More recently, defendants have sought orders for costs against
plaintiffs’ lawyers in circumstances where it has been asserted that the
class action commenced had no prospect of success.  While the sug-
gestion of such an application has in the past been the subject of some
adverse comment, the Federal Court recently ordered a firm of plain-
tiffs’ lawyers to pay the defendant’s costs on an indemnity basis, for
the reason that the firm gave no consideration, or no proper consid-
eration, to the question whether the federal claim had any prospect of
success.76  This decision constitutes a clear warning that those advising
plaintiffs should not commence class actions hastily or without full
and proper consideration.
6. Termination of a Class Action.  Once a class action has been
commenced, the court has the power to order, in certain circum-
stances and on application by the defendant or by its own motion, the
dered to contribute to costs, even where the plaintiff has insufficient finances to satisfy any costs
order.
73. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33ZJ (Austl.); see also Supreme Court Act,
1986, § 33ZJ (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or. 18A.29
(Vict.).
74. See, e.g., Ryan v. Great Lakes Council (1998) 154 A.L.R. 584 (Austl.) (Wilcox, J.).
75. See Tobacco Control Coalition Inc. v. Philip Morris (Austl.) Ltd. (2000) F.C.A. 1404
(Austl.).
76. See Cook v. Pasminco Ltd. II (2000) F.C.A. 1819 (Austl.).
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discontinuance of the proceedings as a class action.77  Such an order
might be made where the cost of the proceedings would be excessive,
having regard to the costs which would be incurred if each group
member conducted a separate proceeding.78  Similarly, the courts
have the power to order the discontinuance of the proceedings where
the class action mechanism would not provide an efficient and effec-
tive means of dealing with the claims of group members or it is oth-
erwise inappropriate for the proceedings to continue in a representa-
tive form.79  The court may also order the stay of proceedings where
no reasonable cause of action is disclosed or where the proceedings
are oppressive, frivolous, or otherwise an abuse of process.80
The fact that the courts have such extensive powers to terminate
or stay a class action has been relied upon to justify a number of key
aspects of Australian class action procedure.  First, as has already
been noted, these powers have been seen as a substitute for U.S.–
style certification.81  Second, they have been relied upon by the High
Court to act as a counterpoise to that Court’s liberal construction of
the requirement that there be a substantial common issue.82  Third,
they have been deployed in answer to critics of the class action proce-
dure who argue that it only serves to encourage speculative, lawyer–
driven litigation, the cost of which is ultimately borne by the public at
large.  At the same time, those acting for plaintiffs have criticized the
fact that defendants have been quick to bring motions seeking to ter-
minate or strike out class action claims.83  Of course, their objections
may well be motivated by the general success of these applications.
The extent to which the courts will be prepared to exercise the
power to terminate class actions has yet to be determined.  In the
early cases, there was a degree of reluctance on the part of the courts
77. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33N(1) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33N(1) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.13(1) (Vict.).
78. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33N(1)(a) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33N(1)(a) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.13(1)(a) (Vict.).
79. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33N(1)(c), (d) (Austl.); see also Supreme
Court Act, 1986, § 33N(1)(c), (d) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules,
1996, Or. 18A.13(1)(c), (d) (Vict.).
80. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33ZG(b) (Austl.).
81. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
82. See Wong v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd. (1999) 199 C.L.R. 255 (Austl.) at ¶ 29; infra discussion
Section IV.B.4.
83. See, e.g., Nicholas Reece, Defence Tactics Lack Class, Says Lawyer, AUSTL. FIN. REV.,
Apr. 28, 2000, at 29.
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to exercise the power in favor of defendants.84  Some courts appeared
to adopt this approach on the basis that use of the new procedure
should be encouraged and that they should, wherever possible, ac-
commodate the plaintiff’s wish to have an action proceed as a class
action.85  More recently, however, there has been a hardening of atti-
tude.  In part this probably reflects a growing realization on the part
of the courts that some of the proceedings commenced as class actions
would simply overwhelm the court system if allowed to proceed.  This
harder line is reflected in the comments of the High Court that, if it
becomes evident that a class action is not the preferable means of
dealing efficiently with a case, the court should, in its discretion, ter-
minate the representative nature of the action.86
7. Settlement or Discontinuance of a Class Action.  A class ac-
tion may not be settled or discontinued without the approval of the
court.  A court may make any orders that it thinks are just in relation
to the distribution of the money paid under the settlement or paid
into court.87  A court cannot approve a settlement until notice has
been given to class members.88
An interesting issue arises where some class members do not
show a willingness to participate in settlement, but have not opted out
by the time the rest of the class has agreed to specific terms of settle-
ment.89  This raises a question as to whether these so–called “free-
loaders” can be excluded from any settlement that is approved.  The
question was recently considered by the Federal Court in Wong &
Ors v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd.90  In that case, class members were given no-
tice of proposed terms of settlement and an opportunity to agree to,
84. See Tropical Shine Holdings Pty Ltd. v. Lake Gesture Pty. Ltd. & Ors (1993) 45 F.C.R.
457 (Austl.).
85. See id. at 462.
86. See Wong v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd. (1999) 199 C.L.R. 255 (Austl.), at ¶ 33 (approving the
approach of the trial judge).
87. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33V (Austl.); see also Supreme Court Act,
1986, § 33V (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or. 18A.20
(Vict.).  Similarly, the person or persons who actually commenced the action may only withdraw
from the proceedings or settle their individual claims with the leave of the Court.  See Federal
Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33W(1) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court Act, 1986, § 33W(1)
(Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or. 18A.21(1) (Vict.).
88. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33X(4) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33X(4) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.22(4) (Vict.).
89. See Wong v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd. (2000) F.C.A. 1421 (Austl.).
90. See id.
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or dispute the reasonableness of, the proposed terms.91  Some of the
class had reached what the Court found to be an informed settlement
agreement with the defendants.92  The remaining members did not
give instructions to settle, nor did they commence their own pro-
ceedings.93
The Court held that it was fair and reasonable to exclude the
members who had not expressed any willingness to settle and who
had not contributed to or been involved in settlement negotiations.94
Indeed, the Court referred to one such member as a “parasitical
freeloader who is not prepared to do anything in his own self–interest
that may have a cost to him.”95  Two other members had expressed
their wish to have a settlement different from that proposed, but
without any personal involvement by way of submission and (inferen-
tially) by way of cost.  The Court held that it was also fair to exclude
them from the approved settlement scheme on the basis that they
“want[ed] to have some of the cake without contributing in any way
to the preparation of it.”96
The Court in Wong also set out some of the factors that the
Court should take into account when deciding whether or not to ap-
prove a proposed settlement.97  These include the likely cost and dura-
tion of the proceedings if approval is not given, the sum offered, and
the likelihood of success in the proceedings.98
IV.  AUSTRALIAN CLASS ACTIONS IN PRACTICE
This Section first explores the practical differences between class
actions brought in the Federal Court as opposed to the Supreme
Court of Victoria.  It then discusses the way in which Australian
courts have interpreted the provisions of the class action procedures.
A. Differences Between Federal Court and Supreme Court of
Victoria Class Actions
While the rules with respect to class actions are essentially the
same in the Federal Court and the Supreme Court of Victoria, there
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. ¶ 24 (Spender, J.).
95. Id.
96. Id. ¶ 30 (Spender, J.).
97. See id. ¶ 18 (Spender, J.).
98. See id.
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are two important differences in practice between class actions
brought in these Courts.  First, the Federal Court is a court of limited
jurisdiction in the sense that it is restricted to the determination of
proceedings involving matters of federal law.  This is a consequence
of a recent decision of the High Court, which held that state jurisdic-
tion cannot be vested in federal courts—this means that the Federal
Court cannot determine a matter involving only state law; there must
be a federal element.99  The jurisdiction of the Federal Court with re-
spect to a “matter” authorizes the Court to determine all the claims,
federal and non–federal, which are involved in the controversy.  If a
matter is brought before the Federal Court but the federal claim is
unsuccessful or struck out, this does not necessarily deprive the Court
of jurisdiction to deal with the non–federal claims.100
In any event, much of Australia’s product liability, corporations,
and consumer protection law is governed by federal statutes.101  As a
consequence, it is possible to commence a class action in the Federal
Court under an extraordinarily broad range of claims, save for those
in which the sole cause of action is founded in common law negli-
gence or contract.  In practice, this is rare as most plaintiffs can find a
cause of action grounded in federal law to plead in the alternative and
thus gain access to the Federal Court.  Still, the establishment of the
Supreme Court of Victoria class action procedure has, at least theo-
retically, expanded the types of class actions which may be brought in
Australia.
A second difference, as mentioned in Section II, is that there is
no real possibility of a jury trial in the Federal Court; while the Fed-
eral Court Act allows parties to apply to the Court for a jury trial, all
99. See Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 C.L.R. 511 (Austl.).  As to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Court, see Part III of the Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 19 (Austl.)
which provides that the Federal Court has such original jurisdiction as is vested in it by laws
made by Federal Parliament.
100. An example of this is the class action involving the explosion in 1998 which resulted in
a disruption of gas supply in the State of Victoria.  The Full Federal Court recently struck out
the federal claim but held that there was sufficient overlap in the factual issues raised by the
federal (trade practices) claim and the non-federal (negligence) claim for it to be said that the
negligence claim formed part of the same “matter” and was thus within the accrued jurisdiction
of the Federal Court.  See Johnson Tiles Pty. Ltd. v. Esso (Austl.) Ltd. (2000) F.C.A. 1572
(Austl.).  On February 16, 2001, the High Court granted leave to appeal the decision of the full
Federal Court.  The date for the hearing of the High Court appeal is yet to be determined.
101. See, e.g., The Corporations Law (Austl.) (corporations); Trade Practices Act, 1974, Part
VA (Austl.) (consumer protection and product liability); Schwartz & Beherns, supra note 38
(product liability).
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such applications to date have failed.102  Thus, a class action com-
menced in the Federal Court will be heard and determined by a judge
alone.  However, juries are not uncommon in the Supreme Court of
Victoria.  Indeed, in the context of Australia, more civil jury trials
take place in Victoria than anywhere else in the country.103  Given the
media interest in class actions, this has the potential to be considera-
bly significant.  It also raises the prospect of significant awards of
damages, particularly in circumstances—for example, in relation to a
common law negligence claim—where there is a claim for punitive or
exemplary damages.104
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Class Action Provisions
1. Threshold Tests.  The three threshold tests which must be
satisfied before a class action can be commenced in Australia105 have
been the subject of much recent judicial consideration as to their ap-
plication.  This is usually in the context of strike–out applications
brought by defendants in which it is argued that the proceedings are
not properly brought as class actions because one or more of the
threshold tests have not been met.106  The threshold requirements
have been liberally interpreted by the courts such that they are easily
satisfied in practice.107
102. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 39 (Austl.) (“In every suit in the Court,
unless the Court or a Judge otherwise orders, the trial shall be by a Judge without a jury.”).  The
Federal Court may direct trial by jury “in any suit in which the ends of justice appear to render
it expedient to do so.”  Id., § 40.  The A.L.R.C. concluded that there is no inherent difference
between representative and individual proceedings which justifies depriving the Federal Court
of its existing discretion to order trial by jury in appropriate cases; but that, in practice, it is most
unlikely that this discretion will be exercised to order a jury trial in representative proceedings.
See A.L.R.C. Report, supra note 17, ¶ 207.
103. For example, from March 1999 until February 2000, there were ten civil jury trials on
foot in the Victorian Supreme Court; eight trials eventually settled, and verdicts were entered in
two.  While these figures are low by American standards, they are relatively high for Australian
jurisdictions.
104. The courts have held that punitive or exemplary damages cannot be awarded in rela-
tion to causes of action arising out of breaches of the provisions of the Trade Practices Act. See
Trade Practices Act, 1974, Part VA (Austl.).  See, e.g., Nixon v. Philip Morris (Austl.) Ltd.
(1999) 95 F.C.R. 453 (Austl.).
105. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33C(1) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33C(1) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.3(1) (Vict.); discussion supra Section III.D.
106. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33N(1) (Austl.); see also Supreme Court
Act, 1986, § 33N(1) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.
18A.13(1) (Vict.); discussion supra Section III.D.6.
107. See discussion infra Section IV.B.2-B.4.
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2. At Least Seven Class Members.  In addition to the require-
ment that there be at least seven class members, the courts have held
that it is not sufficient that one member has a claim against one de-
fendant while other class members have claims against other defen-
dants: to qualify as a class action, all class members must have a claim
against all defendants.108
In Symington & Anor v. Hoechst Schering Agrevo & Ors, an ac-
tion was commenced in the Federal Court by plaintiffs on behalf of
themselves and other persons who allegedly suffered losses following
their detection of an agricultural chemical in beef and beef cattle.109
The plaintiffs claimed that they themselves did not use the chemical,
but rather that the chemical was sprayed from airplanes on the cotton
fields which adjoined their properties.110  In this case, it was not clear
that seven or more persons had a claim against any particular defen-
dant.111  There was some difficulty in establishing which of the several
manufacturers or distributors of the chemical supplied the product
that caused contamination of particular cattle.112  The Court dismissed
the action against the all of the defendants whom the plaintiffs had no
personal claim.113  However, the Court also granted the plaintiffs addi-
tional time to complete investigations concerning the source of the
chemical.114
In Ryan v. Great Lakes Council & Ors, the plaintiff sued on be-
half of himself and all other persons who suffered injury as a result of
eating oysters contaminated with the Hepatitis A virus from the
Wallis Lakes region in New South Wales.115  Again, the Federal Court
held that the plaintiff must have a personal claim against each defen-
dant that is shared by at least six other persons.116  In its decision, the
Court held that the legislation does not prevent several defendants
being joined in a single class action, so long as the commencement
and standing requirements are met by the plaintiff with respect to
each of them.117
108. See, e.g., Philip Morris (Austl.) Ltd. v. Nixon (2000) 170 A.L.R. 487 (Austl.) ¶ 155; see
also A.L.R.C. Report, supra note 17, ¶¶ 69, 95, 133.
109. (1997) 149 A.L.R. 261 (Austl.).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 265 (Wilcox, J.).
114. See id. at 264.
115. (1997) 78 F.C.R. 309 (Austl.).
116. See id. at 312 (Wilcox, J.).
117. See id.
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The requirement that each represented person have a claim
against each defendant has recently been reaffirmed by the full Fed-
eral Court.118  That Court held that just because a person is ultimately
adjudged to be entitled to succeed against only one defendant does
not mean that the person makes a claim against only that defendant.119
The first threshold test will be satisfied so long as each class member
makes a claim against each defendant.120  It matters not whether each
member is ultimately successful in its claims against each defendant.121
3. Same, Similar, or Related Circumstances.  This requirement is
obviously met in cases where a single act or omission by the defen-
dant allegedly causes injury to the class members.  An example of
such a situation is an airplane crash.  However, the requirement has
been interpreted to include situations which involve the claims of per-
sons separated in terms of time, place, and individual circumstance.
In Zhang v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government and
Ethnic Affairs, the Federal Court held that:
Each claim is based on a set of facts which may include acts, omis-
sions, contracts, transactions and other events.  As appears from §
33C(2) [of the Federal Court Act] the circumstances giving rise to
claims by potential group members do not fall outside the scope of
the legislation simply because they involve separate contracts or
transactions between individual group members and the respon-
dent or involve separate acts or omissions of the respondent done
or omitted to be done in relation to individual group members.122
The Court considered that the outer limits of eligibility for participa-
tion in class actions are defined by reference to claims with respect to
or arising out of related circumstances, and that the word “related”
suggests a connection wider than identity or similarity.123  In each case,
a threshold judgment must be made as to whether the similarities or
relationships between circumstances giving rise to each claim are suf-
ficient to merit their grouping as a class action.124  The Court proposed
that, at the margins, these will be practical judgments informed by the
policy and purpose of the legislation.125  Further, the Court held that
118. See King v. GIO Austl. Holdings Ltd. (2000) F.C.A. 1543 (Austl.); see also King v. GIO
Austl. Holdings Ltd. (2000) F.C.A. 617 (Austl.), ¶ 29.
119. See King v. GIO Austl. Holdings Ltd. (2000) F.C.A. 1543 (Austl.) ¶ 7.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. (1993) 45 F.C.R. 384, 404 (Austl.) (French, J.).
123. See id. at 405.
124. See id.
125. See id.
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at some point along the spectrum of possible classes of claims, the
relationship between the circumstances of each claim will be incapa-
ble of definition at a sufficient level of particularity, or too tenuous or
remote to attract the application of the legislation.126
In Tropical Shine Holdings Pty. Ltd. v. Lake Gesture Pty. Ltd. &
Ors,127 the Federal Court held that the description of the class satisfied
the threshold requirements because:
Although the claims differ, the applicant’s personal claim is not in-
compatible with the [class] members’ claim.  On the contrary, it is
an essential ingredient of the applicant’s personal claim that people
were misled by the advertisements into purchasing furniture from
[its competitor].  The cases divide only after that fact is estab-
lished.128
In Wong & Ors v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd., Judge Spender, sitting in the
Federal Court (at first instance), acknowledged that in that case there
were non–common issues involved in the various individual com-
plaints and that in each individual case, there was the question of reli-
ance which was a matter confined to the individual class member.129
His Honor also acknowledged the further contentious question,
namely, whether the “material prejudice” referred to in the relevant
Act required an examination of the subjective circumstances of the
purchaser or whether it could be objectively determined.130  Despite
these issues, Judge Spender held that the claims of the proposed class
members in those proceedings satisfied the requirements of same,
similar, or related circumstances: the claims were all based on the
representations made concerning resale of land, at a profit, before
settlement, performance, projections, any inquiry into whether the
requirements of the relevant Act had been complied with, and the as-
sociated question of whether the representations made were accu-
rate.131
On appeal, a majority of the Full Federal Court in Silkfield Pty.
Ltd. v. Wong disagreed with Judge Spender’s conclusion.132  In consid-
ering the second and third threshold requirements, the Court held
that only one issue in that action, concerning the accuracy of a
126. See id.
127. See (1993) 45 F.C.R. 457 (Austl.).
128. Id. at 464 (Wilcox, J.).
129. See (1998) A.T.P.R. ¶ 41-613 (Austl.).
130. See id. ¶ 40,725.
131. See id.
132. See Silkfield Pty. Ltd. v. Wong (1998) 90 F.C.R. 152 (Austl.).
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pleaded representation, was a common issue.133  From that, it could
not be concluded that the resolution of this issue would be likely to
wholly or substantially resolve the claims of individuals, particularly
their entitlement to damages.134  The appeal was allowed and the pro-
ceedings remitted for determinations of the plaintiffs’ claims indi-
vidually.135
However, in Wong v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd., the High Court over-
turned the decision of the Full Federal Court and effectively agreed
with the reasoning of the trial judge.136  Consequently, it will now be
sufficient if the claims of the members of the class arise out of the
same or similar circumstances, there being no additional requirement
that it be a central or substantial issue.137  This case is considered fur-
ther below.
4. Substantial Common Issue of Law or Fact.  This requirement
has proven to be the most controversial.  In Silkfield Pty. Ltd. v.
Wong, a majority of the Full Federal Court stated that
Section 33C(1)(c) [of the Federal Court Act] does not permit an ac-
tion to be commenced under Pt IVA merely because there is an is-
sue of fact or law common to the claims of all group members: the
common issue must have the additional quality of being a ‘substan-
tial’ common issue. . . . [The common issue must be] an issue with
some special significance for the resolution of the claims of all the
group members . . . [or be] likely to have a major impact on the
conduct and outcome of the litigation.138
On that basis, the Court indicated that
The kind of case that can best be run as a representative proceeding
is one arising out of a “mass wrong,” i.e., out of a single act, omis-
sion or course of conduct or the same act, omission or course of
conduct repeatedly made or engaged in, and thus a case in which
one or a handful of representative parties are able themselves to
give the evidence necessary to present a large part of the case for
all group members.139
On appeal in Wong v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd., the High Court consid-
ered Part IVA of the Federal Court Act in the context of the regimes
for representative actions which had preceded it, as discussed in Sec-
133. See id. at 171 (O’Loughlin & Drummond, JJ.).
134. See id.
135. See id. at 172.
136. See Wong v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd. (1999) 199 C.L.R. 255 (Austl.).
137. See id. ¶ 28.
138. Silkfield Pty. Ltd. v. Wong (1998) 90 F.C.R. 152 (Austl.), at 166, 167.
139. Id. at 171.
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tion III of this Article.  The High Court held that the purpose of the
enactment of Part IVA, in that context, was clearly not to narrow ac-
cess to the new form of representative proceedings beyond that which
applied under the existing regimes.140  Consequently, the Court con-
cluded that
“substantial” does not indicate that which is “large” or “of special
significance” or would “have a major impact on the . . . litigation”
but, rather, is directed to issues which are “real or of substance.”141
Whether the requisite degree of commonality of issues of law or
fact is achieved will depend upon the circumstances of each individual
case.  However, the High Court’s decision in Wong v. Silkfield Pty.
Ltd. means that a reasonably liberal approach will now be adopted by
Australian courts.  That is, the test of substantiality is a wide one,
which merely requires that the common issue not be trivial or color-
able in the sense of being superficial.  It need not, however, be a cen-
tral or major issue.142
5. An Escape Hatch.  Importantly, however, the High Court
held in Wong v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd. that a class action which passes the
threshold tests may later be terminated as a class action,143 by order
made under Section 33N of the Federal Court Act.144  The High Court
quoted with approval Judge Spender’s judgment at first instance:
There will always be a large degree of evaluation concerning com-
monality and non–commonality of issues and ultimately, if because
of the extent of non–common issues, representative proceedings in
the assessment of the court are not the preferable means of dealing
efficiently and effectively with the claims, the court will no doubt
terminate the representative nature of the proceedings in the exer-
cise of the discretion conferred by section 33N(1)(d) of the [Federal
Court of Australia] Act.145
The High Court distinguished Sections 33C and 33N in terms of
the stage of litigation at which the provisions come into play.146  Their
Honors found that Section 33C is only relevant at the commencement
of a class action, whereas a Section 33N application should only be
140. See Wong v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd. (1999) 199 C.L.R. 255 (Austl.), ¶ 28.
141. Id.
142. See also King v. GIO Austl. Holdings Ltd. (2000) 100 F.C.R. 209, ¶¶ 47, 51.
143. See (1999) 199 C.L.R. 255, ¶ 33.
144. Indeed, the Court found that this confirmed their liberal construction of substantiality.
Cf. Supreme Court Act, 1986, § 33N (Vict.); Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules,
1996, Or. 18A.13(1) (Vict.).  See discussion supra Section III.D.6.
145. Wong v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd. [1998] A.T.P.R. ¶ 41-613, at 40,726 (Austl.).
146. See Wong v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd. (1999) 199 C.L.R. 255 (Austl.), ¶ 26.
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made at a later stage, preferably after pleadings have closed.147  In
Wong v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd., it was too early to determine an applica-
tion pursuant to Section 33N.
It therefore appears that, even where the threshold tests are sat-
isfied at the commencement of a class action, Australian courts will
be willing to entertain a Section 33N strike–out application later in
the proceedings.  In this sense, after the issues in dispute have been
properly clarified, Section 33N provides courts with an “escape
hatch” through which the issues may pass in order to terminate inap-
propriate class actions.
6. Specificity of Pleadings.  Another method which has been
used to strike out class actions is the careful curial analysis of the
pleadings.  Australia has a system of fact pleading which is stricter
than the system of issues or notice pleading used in the United States.
The principal rule of pleading in Australia is that the “material facts”
must be pleaded.148  Once an issue is joined in the pleadings, the court
and the parties are confined to the facts contained therein.  At the
end of a case, if the pleadings do not conform with the evidence, the
case will be lost.  While the rules provide for the amendment of
pleadings at any time after they are filed, this will not be allowed if
prejudice will be suffered by the opponent as a result of such amend-
ment.
The courts have held that the normal pleading rules apply to
class actions as they do to any other action before the court.149  Con-
sequently, the initiating process must set out the material facts which
the plaintiff alleges give rise to the cause or causes of action on which
the plaintiff and class members rely, together with the particulars of
the nature and extent of the their injuries or other loss.
At the same time, the courts have held that it may be sufficient
for the plaintiff to plead the case of each class member at a “reasona-
bly high level of generality.”150  That is, the plaintiff is not necessarily
bound to plead material facts specific to each class member.  Rather,
the plaintiff must furnish a statement of the case sufficient to allow
147. See id.; see also King v. GIO Austl. Holdings Ltd. (2000) 100 F.C.R. 209, ¶ 52.
148. See F.C.R., Or. 11.2 (“A pleading of a party shall contain, and contain only, a statement
in a summary form of the material facts on which he relies, but not the evidence by which those
facts are to be proved.”); see, e.g., Supreme Court Rules Pt. 15 R.7(1) (N.S.W.).
149. See, e.g., Philip Morris (Austl.) Ltd. v. Nixon (2000) 170 A.L.R. 487 (Austl.), ¶ 129;
Harrison v. Lidoform Pty. Ltd. [1998] F.C.A. 1487 (Austl.).
150. Philip Morris v. Nixon (2000) 170 A.L.R. 487 (Austl.), ¶ 133.
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the defendant a fair opportunity to meet it.151  The courts’ allowance
of a high degree of generality in pleading the claims of class members
obviously makes it harder for defendants to understand the case
against them.
While the class action procedures do not have special pleadings
rules, they require that the initiating process describe or otherwise
identify the class members to whom the proceeding relates, specify
the nature of the claims made on behalf of the class members and the
relief claimed, and specify the question(s) of law or fact common to
the claims of the class members.152  However, in describing class, it is
not necessary to name or to specify the number of the members.153
Given these requirements, the pleadings will be examined closely
by the courts to ensure that the action is adequately pleaded and
should properly continue in representative form.  The requirement
that the representative party plead the claims of the represented per-
sons is easy to achieve in a single–event class action, such as an air-
plane crash or food poisoning, but is much more difficult where there
are numerous individual issues in dispute, such as in drug and medical
device litigation.
Consequently, in several recent class actions, defendants in the
Federal Court have brought applications to strike out pleadings on
the basis, shortly put, that:
 The pleading does not relate to any particular class member
but, rather, is a smorgasbord of all of the possible combina-
tions and permutations of claims which may apply to any
class member, but in fact apply to none; or
 The pleading particularizes the claim of the represented party
alone and that person’s claim is not representative of the
class.
The argument has been that the pleading is defective both generally
and insofar as the class action provisions are concerned.
For example, in Harrison v. Lidoform Pty. Ltd., the Federal
Court struck out the relevant parts of the statement of claim as defec-
tive because they did not articulate the case of the various subgroups
151. See id. ¶ 131.
152. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33H(1); see also Supreme Court Act, 1986,
§ 33H(2) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.18A.07(2)
(Vict.).
153. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33H(2); see also Supreme Court Act, 1986,
§ 33H(3) (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.18A.07(3)
(Vict.).
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that the plaintiff claimed to represent.154  In so doing, the Court held
that
[a] representative party may be able to enforce the rights of others
in a proceeding brought under Part IVA, but the statement of claim
needs to identify what the rights of those represented are claimed
to be, and how they are said to arise. . . . It is also necessary that
class members know with some precision the nature of the case
which the applicant seeks to bring on their behalf so that they can
decide . . . whether to opt out of a claim formulated in that way. . . .
In Connell v. Nevada Financial Group Pty Ltd. Drummond J. em-
phasized the importance of the pleadings in specifying precisely
what representations were made to individuals within a class so that
the Court can be satisfied that each class member truly does set up
a representation to the same substance and effect.  In Cameron v.
Qantas Airways Ltd. Beaumont J. . . took the view, with which I re-
spectfully agree, that it is not sufficient to plead the personal claim
of the representative, without clearly articulating the basis of the
claims of those whom the applicant purports to represent.155
The most recent and prominent example of a successful strike–
out application by defendants on the basis of defective pleadings is
the Australian tobacco class action, Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd. &
Ors v. Nixon & Ors.156  In Nixon, damages were sought on behalf of
smokers who had contracted diseases that were allegedly smoking
related.  The smokers claimed that six cigarette corporations had
engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct157 in that their cigarettes
were promoted as being healthy products, or at least healthier and
safer than other corporations’ cigarettes, that these corporations were
negligent158 in making such representations, and that, as a result of
such conduct, the smokers were induced to begin or continue
smoking the defendants’ cigarettes.
The defendant corporations brought a motion, arguing inter alia
that the proceedings were not properly constituted as a class action
since it could not be shown that each smoker had smoked cigarettes
manufactured or distributed by all of the corporations or had com-
menced or continued smoking as a result of the conduct of all of the
corporations, as required by the rules.159  The Full Federal Court
154. See (1998) F.C.A. 1487 (Austl.).
155. Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted).
156. See (2000) 170 A.L.R. 487 (Austl.).  On June 21, 2000, the High Court refused the
plaintiffs leave to appeal the decision of the Full Federal Court.
157. See Trade Practices Act, 1974, §52 (Austl.) (prohibiting misleading or deceptive adver-
tising).
158. That is, in breach of their common law duty of care.
159. See Nixon, 170 A.L.R. 487 (Austl.).
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unanimously upheld the defendants’ motion.160  The Court held that
the pleadings did not allege facts that would have established that
each class member had a claim against each defendant.161  Therefore,
even if the alleged facts were proven, it could not be said that every
class member suffered loss or damage as a result of the misleading or
deceptive conduct, or negligence, of every defendant.  The claims
were of disparate instances of deception caused by different state-
ments made by the defendant corporations, and which were therefore
not properly described as being against all defendants or as arising
out of the same, similar, or related circumstances (the claims could
not be regarded as even being related since the conduct alleged was
diverse and spanned a period of some forty years).162  Indeed, the
Court further stated that, leaving the question of substantiality to one
side, it was doubtful whether there were actually any questions of law
or fact common to all of the class members’ claims.163
The fact that there had been multiple unsuccessful attempts by
the class members to plead their claims so as to comply with the re-
quirements for the bringing of a class action was a further indication
that the proceedings were not properly brought as a class action.164
One of the judges stated that it was not in the interests of justice—in-
deed it was actually productive of injustice to the defendants—to
permit the proceedings to continue as a class action.165  The situation
may have been different had the smokers claimed that the corpora-
tions had collectively embarked on a campaign designed to create a
false community perception about the health risks associated with
smoking.
Two of the three judges in that case refused the plaintiffs leave to
replead on the basis that no matter what amendments were made to
the pleadings, the action could not properly be brought as a class ac-
tion.166  Accordingly, it can be seen that, although defects in pleadings
160. See id.  The bench was comprised of Judges Spender, Hill, and Sackville.  Judge
Sackville wrote the leading judgment with which the other judges agreed, except that the latter
justices refused the plaintiffs leave to re-plead, while Judge Sackville granted such leave.
161. See id. ¶ 155 (Sackville, J.).
162. See id. ¶¶ 162-166 (Sackville, J.).
163. See id. ¶ 167 (Sackville, J.).
164. See id. ¶ 10 (Spender, J.), ¶ 16 (Hill, J.).  There were six written versions of the initiat-
ing process, as well as oral changes to those pleadings, made during the course of proceedings
before the primary judge.
165. See id. ¶ 20 (Hill, J.).
166. See id. ¶ 1 (Spender, J.), ¶ 15 (Hill, J.).  Judge Sackville, however, found that the pro-
ceeding was not properly constituted as a representative proceeding as then pleaded, and so
granted leave to re-plead.  See id. ¶ 189.
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might be cured by amendment, there is a substantive threshold, which
must be crossed by the plaintiff and the represented persons before a
class action can properly be brought.  The message given in Nixon is
that the inherently individual nature of the class members’ claims may
mean that proceedings are not properly constituted as a class action.
V.  A MODEL CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE?
The perception and understanding of most Australians, including
many lawyers, of its class action procedure is based on American film
and television.  However, despite the apparent similarities, there are,
in fact, many differences between Australian and American class ac-
tions.
Class actions were introduced into Australian law as part of a
package of measures which were actually intended to increase the in-
cidence of consumer and product liability litigation in Australia, as
discussed in Section III of this Article.  These changes, and particu-
larly the introduction of a class action procedure, were heralded by
those who act for plaintiffs as a significant victory for consumers.  For
its part, the business community saw the changes as the start of an in-
evitable slide into an abyss of U.S.–style litigation.
In fact, as is so often the case, the truth lies somewhere in be-
tween.  It is undoubtedly true that the level of litigation in Australia
has increased significantly.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers, while initially slow to
recognize the class action mechanism, are now exploring the range of
opportunities it presents.  However, the results to date have been
mixed.  While plaintiffs have succeeded in a number of class actions,
they are yet to win what might be described as a “blockbuster” judg-
ment.
Class plaintiffs have fared reasonably well in Australia in cases
where the injuries to class members all stem from a single cause at a
distinct point in time (for example, food poisoning resulting from con-
taminated oysters).167  This is because in such cases, issues relating to a
defendant’s liability do not differ significantly from one class member
to the next.
Unlike an action arising out of a single accident or single course
of conduct, however, product liability litigation (particularly drug and
medical device litigation) often involves individual factual and legal
issues.  Such issues include differing models or types of products,
167. See, e.g., Graham Barclay Oysters Pty. Ltd. v. Ryan (2000) A.T.P.R. (Digest) ¶ 46-207
(Austl.).
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changes in design or formulation from year to year, varying represen-
tations by the manufacturer to the consumer, the intervention of a
“learned intermediary” such as a physician,168 variances in the law of
product liability, and a wide array of affirmative defenses.169  In par-
ticular, problems are created in that causation must be considered on
a person–by–person basis, which is impractical and even impossible in
proceedings conducted in the form of a class action.  The best recent
example of this is, of course, Nixon.170
This problem has often proved to be the reason why certification
has been denied in the United States, and was well expressed by the
court in In re Northern District of California Dalkon Shield IUD
Products Liability Litigation:
In the typical mass tort situation, such as an airplane crash or a
cruise ship food poisoning, proximate cause can be determined on a
class–wide basis because the cause of the common disaster is the
same for each of the plaintiffs.  In product liability actions, how-
ever, individual issues may outnumber common issues.  No single
happening or accident occurs to cause similar types of physical
harm or property damage.  No one set of operative facts establishes
liability.  No single proximate cause applies equally to each poten-
tial class member and each defendant.  Furthermore, the alleged
tortfeasor’s affirmative defenses (such as failure to follow direc-
tions, assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, and the stat-
ute of limitations) may depend on facts peculiar to each plaintiff’s
case.171
It is the Authors’ opinion that such cases are never appropriate
to proceed as class actions.  Indeed, this is evidenced by the pleading
168. It has long been accepted in the United States that there is a special exception to the
general rule that a product supplier’s duty to warn of inherently dangerous characteristics is
owed to the ultimate user of that product.  The exception is that manufacturers of prescription
drugs normally may discharge their duty to warn by giving adequate warnings to the medical
profession who prescribe or administer the products to their patients.  Thus the physician is said
to be a learned intermediary—a professional who is best qualified to interpret the manufac-
turer’s product instructions and warnings and to convey them to the patient or consumer.  See
N. Kathleen Strickland, Current Applications and Limitations on the Learned Intermediary Rule,
35(8) FOR THE DEFENSE 14 (1993).  While not being labelled as such, the concept of the
learned intermediary has recently been utilized in the Federal Court.  See Wilkins v. Dovuro
Pty. Ltd. (1999) 169 A.L.R. 276 (Austl.) ¶¶ 119-127.  In that case, the supplier of canola seed to
a seed distributor (intermediary) successfully defended a negligence claim brought by end-users
of the seed on the basis that the distributor failed to conduct an intermediate inspection of the
seed.  See, e.g., David J. Kearney, Learned Intermediary Defence—Alive and Well in Australia?,
11(3) AUSTL. PROD. LIAB. REPORTER 33 (2000).
169. See In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1084-85 (6th Cir. 1996).
170. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
171. In re Northern District of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d
847, 853 (9th Cir. 1982).
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problems that are posed by having to arrive at a non–contentious
class description and a properly particularized statement of claim.172
It has certainly been the Australian experience that it is these claims
which have the most tortuous interlocutory path and which have the
greatest chance of being struck out or discontinued.
Consequently, in developing a new and more “ideal” class action
procedure, it is submitted that the key is to minimize the extent to
which the procedure is used to resolve cases that involve a multitude
of individual issues and thereby raise difficult questions of causation.
In this particular respect, the approach of American courts and legis-
lation is to be preferred to that of Australia.
When the Federal Parliament introduced the law that established
the first Australian class action procedure, it stated the objectives of
the procedure as the following:
 Enhance access to justice, which is often denied by the high
cost of litigation;
 Reduce the cost of proceedings, since groups are able to ob-
tain cost–effective redress; and
 Promote efficiency in the use of the court’s resources.173
It is difficult to fault the logic behind the concept of class actions,
given that they are a means of facilitating the administration of justice
by enabling parties with the same or similar interests to secure a de-
termination in one action rather than in separate actions.  In theory,
class actions should also benefit defendants by minimizing their risk
of exposure to conflicting judgments in relation to different plaintiffs.
But this does not mean that all grouped individual claims should
qualify as class actions.  Unfortunately, there has been a trend for
Australian plaintiffs’ lawyers to seek to widen the class of plaintiffs to
the point of the ridiculous from an efficiency or fairness perspective.
Indeed, the extremely (and deliberately) plaintiff–friendly nature of
Australian class action procedure seems to encourage this.
The recent decisions of superior courts in Australia, however,
are a sure sign that courts are taking on some of the responsibility for
preventing the class action procedure from being abused in this way.
The courts have come to recognize the extraordinary difficulties that
will be created by allowing a case to proceed as a class action where
there are a large number of class members, each of whom rely upon
172. See Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 33H; see also Supreme Court Act, 1986, §
33H (Vict.); cf. Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996, Or.18A.07 (Vict.).
173. See A.L.R.C. Report, supra note 17, ¶ 13.
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disparate facts or whose individual claims can only finally be resolved
by careful, individual analysis.
The courts’ initial, somewhat laissez faire, approach which was
marked by a reluctance to impose constraints upon the new rules has
given way to a realization of the difficulties that would be created in
allowing a mass of individual claims with limited common issues to
proceed as a class action.  Notwithstanding the plaintiff–friendly na-
ture of the procedure and the fact that the threshold tests have been
liberally interpreted, courts have done two things to prevent the inef-
ficient or ineffective use of the class action mechanism.  First, courts
have marked the way to an escape hatch through the use of strike–out
applications after the issues in dispute have been defined.  Second,
they have applied preexisting court rules to ensure that the claims of
all represented persons are properly pleaded.
As yet, no class action involving a drug or medical device has
proceeded to trial.  A handful have been settled while others have
been struck out or discontinued by the plaintiffs in the face of strident
opposition from the defendants and a clear unwillingness on the part
of the court to allow the matter to proceed.174  Attempts to pursue to-
bacco class actions have met a similar fate.175  While this new realiza-
tion has been welcomed by defendants, the fact remains that the
original authors of Australia’s scheme effectively ensured that a range
of cases which would never be allowed to proceed as class actions in
the United States can proceed as such in Australia.
The real test will come over the next two or three years.  There
are a number of significant class actions proceeding through the in-
terlocutory stages which will, seemingly, come to trial.  In at least one
of these actions, that arising out of the failure of Melbourne’s gas
supply, the Federal Court is faced with thousands of claims, the reso-
lution of which require the determination of not just the quantum of
each individual’s loss, but also issues of causation, contractual liabil-
ity, and reliance upon representations made by the various defen-
dants.176  How this will be achieved is yet to be seen.
174. For example, in late 2000, the Fen–Phen class action was discontinued as a representa-
tive proceeding in the Federal Court and transferred as an individual proceeding to the Su-
preme Court of New South Wales.  See Crandell v Servier Laboratories (Austl.) Pty. Ltd.
175. See Philip Morris (Austl.) Ltd. v. Nixon (2000) 170 A.L.R. 487; supra note 156 and ac-
companying text.
176. See Johnson Tiles Pty. Ltd. v. Esso (Austl.) Ltd. [2000] F.C.A. 1572 (Austl.).  These
proceedings have been afoot since late 1998 and the trial is awaiting the outcome of a High
Court appeal in relation to whether the Federal Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter.  See
supra note 100.
